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Abstract
This article examines how China's rise and increasing tensions with Japan are 
portrayed by South Korean bloggers. The deterioration in relations between 
China and Japan over the last two years generally projects onto the ways and 
means by which China's rise is portrayed in South Korea. Since Korea's relations 
with both its more populous neighbours have been historically fraught, and 
since it is also implicated in various territorial disputes with both countries, 
determining Korean sensibilities is an important way of gauging shifts in public 
opinion across the region. Although the conservative political establishments in 
both South Korea and Japan might see China as a constant threat, South Korean 
and Japanese netizens still popularly view each other with suspicion. By contrast, 
popular perceptions of the China threat in either country can be swayed by 
escalation of territorial disputes these two US allies still have with one another.
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Introduction
China's resurgence on the world stage has clearly manifested itself over 
the past year in a much bolder stance toward Japan. Partly in response 
to the Japanese state purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets, a boycott 
of Japanese goods swept across China, seriously affecting bilateral 
economic relations. Although much attention, for example in the media, 
throughout this ongoing territorial dispute has been devoted to ofﬁcial 
positions and interactions, this article instead focuses on the unmediated 
seam of popular animosity between the two countries as expressed online 
in blogs. Furthermore, the issue will not be conventionally explored 
through the prism of Sino–Japanese exchanges, which have already 
received much attention (Fogel 2010; Lary 2010; Rose 2004; Rozman 
2004).
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Rather, we will examine how China's rise and increasing tensions 
with Japan are portrayed by South Korean bloggers. We do this as part 
of a broader research agenda that seeks to elucidate third-party popular 
perceptions of territorial disputes across East Asia.1 In other words, we 
are primarily interested to know how deterioration in relations between 
China and Japan might project onto the ways and means by which Chi-
na's rise is portrayed in South Korea. Since Korea's relations with both 
its more populous neighbours have been historically fraught, and since 
it is also implicated in various territorial disputes with both countries, 
determining Korean sensibilities is an important way of gauging shifts 
in public opinion across the region. How does the ﬂare-up of a regional 
territorial dispute such as Senkaku/Diaoyu—in which South Korea is 
not implicated—affect popular South Korean perceptions of China and 
Japan? Which side is more likely to be seen as a rival, and which side 
is framed as South Korea's friend as a result? 
Employing a similar rationale and approach, we then explore how 
Japanese popular attitudes are framed in response to escalation in the 
disputes between South Korea and China over Socotra Rock, which is 
submerged in the Yellow Sea, as well as the more conventional territorial 
dispute over Changbai/Paekdu mountain, which is actually situated 
between North Korea and China, but wholly claimed by both North 
and South Korea (Guo 2007).
Ultimately, our analysis of third-party popular perceptions in 
Northeast Asia will include analysis of Chinese opinions on tensions 
between South Korea and Japan over the Tokdo islets (known in Japan as 
Takeshima, and in the West as Liancourt Rocks), a dispute that has some 
parallels with Diaoyu/Senkaku. Preliminary investigations suggest 
that explicit connections between the Tokdo/Takeshima dispute and 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu one are rare in mainstream Chinese media and 
online.2 This is symptomatic of the strong control exerted by the state 
over the media and cyberspace in China, which complicates assessments 
of popular opinion on 'sensitive issues'. We limit our coverage of 
China here to a brief overview of online popular nationalism, before 
concentrating on the more comparable mediascapes and cyberspace 
ecologies of Japan and Korea that are the focus of this article. 
Popular Dynamics of Chinese Nationalism
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began its patriotic educa-
tion campaigns in the 1990s, nationalism was conceived of as a reliable 
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source of much needed legitimacy and popular support. However, the 
volatile nature of popular nationalism, particularly the virulent strain 
evident in Chinese cyberspace, has created unforeseen pressures for 
the government. The rise of popular nationalism has complicated the 
state's monopoly on foreign policy-making, for instance by challenging 
the strategy of 'hide and bide' through the 1990s and early 2000s, which 
was incompatible with the stridency of popular opinion.3 Popular na-
tionalism is thus a double-edged sword, both a source of legitimation 
for continued authoritarian rule, and 'a means for the Chinese people to 
judge the performance of the state' (Zhao 2013: 541). The Party would 
prefer nationalism to be channelled and controlled like the regulated 
waters of a dam, but the strength of grassroots sentiments and the com-
mercial imperatives that prevail in Chinese media and Chinese cyber-
space make it difﬁcult to turn on and off at will (Jiang 2012; Stockmann 
2011). Furthermore, nationalism is not the sole prerogative of the state, 
and in many cases it is led by commercial interests exploiting market 
demand; in the population at large and particularly in the comparatively 
free conditions that pertain in Chinese cyberspace, nationalism 'sells'. 
The world of online gaming provides an example of how state and com-
mercial actors operate cooperatively to leverage popular demand. When 
the Party accepted the popularity of gaming, particularly among the 
younger population, it seized on it as a pedagogical opportunity. Online 
games were declared 'cultural products' and the state made substantial 
investments in the industry so that 'patriotic online games became a joint 
enterprise between the Party-state and private companies' (Nie 2013: 508). 
In combination, state and commercial interests were highly effective in 
inculcating popular nationalist sentiments through online games such 
as the War of Resistance series where players take on the role of various 
Chinese forces ﬁghting against the Japanese occupiers in various bloody 
scenarios. Such games appear to be particularly popular among the 
'angry youth' (fenqing 愤青) that constitute one of the most stridently 
nationalistic cohorts. This demographic is also especially connected and 
active online (Sullivan 2014), responsible for much of the mobilization 
that periodically spills over into physical world demonstrations. 
Yet, despite the rapid growth of the Chinese Internet population and 
fast-moving social media, the state has demonstrated the continuing 
capacity to contain popular nationalism. As Jessica Weiss (2014) shows 
in her analysis of state management of anti-foreign protests from 1985 
to 2012, where prevailing diplomatic conditions and strategic context 
demands it, the state is able and willing to control anti-Japanese dem-
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onstrations, both in the physical world where its capacities are not in 
doubt, and online. The information order in cyberspace is facilitated by 
multiple layers of monitoring and control and reinforced by a sophisti-
cated censorship regime and propaganda mechanisms. State control of 
the physical infrastructure of the Internet and a binding legal framework 
create a norm of self-censorship and self-regulation that ensures that 
commercial Internet companies do not act against the state's regularly 
updated strategic objectives. Thus, as Beijing sought to improve rela-
tions with Tokyo from 2006 to 2010, online petitions and mobilization of 
ofﬂine demonstrations were regularly and robustly restricted. The scale 
of this resolve was demonstrated on the eve of a sensitive anniversary in 
Sino–Japanese relations, when efforts in Chinese cyberspace to organize 
ofﬂine demonstrations were so tightly restricted that the Chinese term 
'Diaoyu' was blocked, while 'Senkaku' evaded censorship (Han 2010). 
On other occasions, notably Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council in 2005 and nationalization of the disputed islands in 
2012, online and ofﬂine protests have been allowed to proceed.
Comparing anti-Japan protests over two decades, James Reilly de-
scribes a cyclical pattern in which 'a single inﬂammatory event can 
spread rapidly across a broad segment of the engaged public, stimulating 
online debates and activism that can spill over into the streets' (2014). 
Although such grassroots mobilization may initially be tolerated by the 
state and encouraged by commercial incentives related to a receptive 
public, the state's cost–beneﬁt calculation changes over time. At the point 
that the state calculates that demonstrations may start to jeopardize 
domestic stability, long-term foreign policy objectives, trade relations, 
etc., the state's information control regime is engaged, controlling the 
tone of media coverage, censoring discussion and putting out counter-
narratives (Reilly 2012). Numerous scholars have noted how online and 
physical world protests can be useful as a safety valve allowing people 
to blow off steam, as a feedback mechanism alerting authorities to how 
strongly the public feels about an issue, and as a tool in internal power 
competitions to signal behaviour (Hasid 2012; Shen and Breslin 2010; 
Sullivan 2012; Weiss 2013). However, scholars have also identiﬁed how 
protests can spiral out of control, as was the case with the 1999 protests 
outside the US Embassy in Beijing following the NATO bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Nationalist causes can also mutate, with 
anger being redirected against the state. Goubin Yang observes that, 'as 
online protests against Japan indicate, online nationalist protests may 
open up new spaces for citizens to exert their discursive rights' (2009: 
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56). In other cases, such as the protests against atrocities committed 
against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in 1998, the state has been attacked 
for demonstrating insufﬁcient patriotism (Hughes 2000). 
Korean Attitudes:  
Suspicion/fear of China and Resentment towards Japan
Both China and Japan have intervened in the Korean peninsula. China's 
involvement in Korean affairs began very early, during the time of the 
Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD). The Chinese invaded the proto-Korean 
kingdom of Gojoseon during the reign of Han Wudi and established 
four commanderies in 108 BC in what is now North Korea. Since then, 
the Chinese have periodically intervened both diplomatically and mili-
tarily in Korean internal affairs, the latest example being the Chinese 
military aid given to North Korea during the Korean War (1950–1953) 
(Chen 1994; Zhang 1995). Similarly, the Japanese continuously troubled 
Korea's southern border regions with their infamous Waegu/Wokou 
pirate raids and full-scale invasions (Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasions, 
1592–1598) and the Japanese occupation and colonization of Korea 
(1910–1945) (Beasley 1991). This long history of being on the receiving 
end of Chinese or Japanese military aggression has left a deep, innate 
and ever-present feeling of grievance among many Koreans towards 
their two powerful neighbours. 
Some Koreans fear China's rising power and are suspicious of its 
intentions towards Korea. At the same time, they feel resentment to-
wards Japan, which brutally colonized Korea in the early twentieth 
century (1910–1945) and still offends Koreans regularly with historical 
revisionism, the 'comfort women' issue in particular (Schellstede 2000), 
and territorial claims to Tokdo, which the Japanese call Takeshima.4 
Tokdo and the comfort women are emotive issues that regularly inﬂame 
nationalist sentiments in Korea and, although they have little potential 
to cause a real military conﬂict between Korea and Japan, they have 
contributed signiﬁcantly to the formation of pro-Chinese opinion among 
some segments of the Korean public in the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands dispute.
While it is highly likely that Japan is still viewed more negatively 
in Korea than China, at least among the general public, among the 
academic and policy making elite, China is now much more of a source 
of fear and suspicion. This fear was already apparent due to Communist 
China's military intervention and invasion of South Korea during the 
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Korean War (1950–1953, in support of the Kim dynasty in North Korea 
and in opposition to the USA and South Korea). It was reignited in 
all sectors of Korean society, not just among the elite, because of the 
so-called Northeast Project (동북공정). The revisionist Chinese claims 
to what the Korean public regards as historical Korean states such as 
Goguryeo and Balhae (동북공정),5 over the past decade have sparked 
an emotional response among nationalistic Koreans and heightened 
anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea. The claims to Goguryeo (also known 
as Koguryo) and Balhae are part of China's concerted effort to strengthen 
its historical–territorial claims on its borders (Duara 1996; Townsend 
1996; Wang 2001; Wang 2012) and to allay its own internal security 
concerns (Chen 2012; Gries 2005). This assertiveness has offended the 
vast majority of the South Korean public.6
As a corollary to this renewed anti-Chinese sentiment, one of the best-
known narratives of Korea's historic struggle against China—the wars 
fought by Goguryeo in the seventh century against the Sui dynasty (589–
618 AD) and then the powerful Tang dynasty (618–907 AD)—have been 
re-emphasized to highlight Korean resistance to Chinese aggression. 
This is reﬂected by the immense popularity of period dramas such as 
the Korean Broadcasting System's (KBS) Dae Jo Yeong (2006–2007), which 
gloriﬁed Goguryeo's heroic resistance to Tang China and was produced 
with the deliberate aim of countering China's historical revisionism.7 A 
reﬂection of the equally, if not more, virulent anti-Japanese sentiment 
in Korea is shown by the success of the KBS period drama Immortal Yi 
Sun Shin, which celebrated the life of Korea's foremost military hero, 
Admiral Yi Sun Shin, who defended Korea against Japanese invaders 
in the sixteenth century.
Many in South Korea, especially the policy planning elite, fear that 
China's historical revisionism (the so-called Northeast Project) is merely 
a smokescreen designed to establish historical claims to territory in 
North Korea in the same way that Tang Taizong used 'history' to justify 
Tang occupation of Goguryeo territory (Shin 2012). For instance, Bak 
Changhee of Gukbang University argues that China has traditionally 
viewed the Korean peninsula as its sphere of inﬂuence and will intervene 
to protect what it sees as its vested interests in North Korea (Park 2012: 
221-222). He also asserts that China's ultimate strategic goal is to expand 
its power further into the Korean peninsula, separate South Korea from 
its alliance with the USA and establish a pro-Chinese government in 
the whole of the peninsula (Park 2012: 228). Such fears of Chinese ag-
gression must be taken into consideration when we examine Korean 
_________________________________________________________________________11
_________________________________________________ Is My Rival's Rival a Friend? 
attitudes, especially academic attitudes towards the islands dispute 
between China and Japan.
Chinese support for North Korea and the perceived snub of South 
Korea following the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in 
2010, have only heightened such fears. Yi Sanghyun from the ministry 
of foreign affairs argues that China's rise and continued support for 
North Korea's Kim dynasty represents a potential threat to South Korea's 
security. He also argues that China's ambition is to turn Korea into a 
buffer zone and dominate the East China Sea (excluding other powers 
such as the USA from East Asian waters), and that China's so-called 
'peaceful rise' might not be so peaceful after all (Yi 2012: 277-278). Yi 
further asserts that China's recent behaviour towards Korea conceals a 
desire to view Sino–Korean relations in the light of the tributary rela-
tions that existed between Korea and China in the pre-modern, 'feudal' 
era, i.e., that it is an expression of arrogance. A fear of Chinese maritime 
expansion and ambitions towards Ieodo (이어도) and Korea's Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea have also been raised by 
academics engaged in Korean naval defence planning. Cha Do Hee, for 
instance, emphasizes the fact that the USA and China are engaged in a 
power struggle over naval hegemony in East Asia. Strengthening the 
US–Korea military alliance and expanding Korean naval capacity are 
needed to defend Korea's maritime borders, trade routes and economic 
interests in the East China Sea (which includes the disputed islands of 
Senkaku/Diaoyu) and to counter China's growing expansionist ambi-
tions (Cha 2012; Yi 2007). 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute in Korean Media 
and Blogs
The territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Di-
aoyu Islands has been followed with keen interest by the South Korean 
media, bloggers and international relations experts. This is primarily 
because its peaceful resolution or violent implosion may have signiﬁcant 
ramiﬁcations for possible future handling by South Korea of its own 
territorial disputes with both Japan (Tokdo dispute) and China (Ieodo, 
Baekdusan and the Gando disputes). Korean attitudes concerning the 
dispute between China and Japan are very diverse. They range from 
those who express sympathy for China (usually those among the general 
public whose political sympathies are left-aligned or have strong anti-
Japanese sentiments) to those who vouch for careful, guarded neutrality 
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or advocate anti-Chinese and pro-Japanese policies (usually those who 
are on the right wing of the political spectrum and are hostile to China's 
perceived territorial ambitions in East Asia). These differing opinions 
and attitudes among Koreans are inseparably linked to Korea's histori-
cal relations with both countries, memories of which can still inﬂame 
nationalist sentiments within Korea. These historical memories of past 
grievances (directed at both Japan and China, but more so at Japan), 
when coupled with existing territorial disputes and economic and stra-
tegic concerns, produce a very complex and varied reaction among the 
Korean public and the academic community. All these aspects of the 
Korean reaction to and representation of the disputes between China 
and Japan will be explored below.
As noted earlier, the majority of the Korean policy planning elite and 
international relations experts (who generally tend to be more conserva-
tive than the mass media and netizens) are more concerned about the 
present threat/pressure coming from China than about past historical 
grievances towards Japan. Many are of the opinion that Korea should 
give support to the maintenance of the status quo with Japan in pos-
session of the disputed islands, while maintaining a show of neutrality 
to avoid antagonizing China. An outright Chinese victory in the affair 
would lead to the domination by China of the vital sea lanes through 
which the majority of Korea's trade trafﬁc and energy supplies pass.8 
However, the anti-Japanese sentiments generated by Japan's repeat-
edly provocative behaviour with regard to the comfort women issue and 
also the continuing Tokdo dispute with Japan made outright support 
for Japan in 2012 a very unappealing course of action for the Korean 
public in general.9 The Korean media and Internet bloggers repeatedly 
pointed out Japan's hypocrisy in claiming territory currently controlled 
by Korea, yet denying China's historical claims to territory controlled 
by Japan. In other words, they suggested that Japan's position vis-à-vis 
China is similar to Korea's position in relation to Japan. This was often 
accompanied by the hope that the resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands dispute would be peaceful and yield useful precedents for Korea 
to utilize in its own territorial dispute with Japan.10 Most of the Korean 
media11 and bloggers12 eventually adopted a semi-neutral stance, taking 
jibes at the Japanese for their double standards when it comes to territo-
rial disputes, but not supporting China either, since Korea is comfortable 
with neither China nor Japan. Policy planners and academics in general 
advocated a careful, measured response to the dispute between Japan 
and China while making sure to pick up any developments that might 
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be of use in future negotiations with China and Japan over Korea's ter-
ritorial disputes with both powers. 
However, political divisions within Korea meant that there was, as 
usual, a pro-Chinese minority that attempted to utilize the anti-Japanese 
feeling in Korea and resulting sympathy, albeit brief, for China among 
the Korean public (largely due to anger towards Japan over Tokdo), to 
advance China's interests. They view China's interests as matching their 
own political goals of advancing rapprochement with North Korea with 
Chinese aid and moving Korea out of America's sphere of inﬂuence (Gang 
and Park 2012). The left-aligned newspapers, bloggers and netizens in 
Korea, who traditionally favoured Communist China and appeasement 
of North Korea, therefore represented the islands dispute in a decidedly 
pro-Chinese light, casting the Japanese as imperialists who had stolen 
Chinese territory just as they now seek to steal Korean territory.13 
Ohmy News, a radical left-wing newspaper, emphasized that Japan 
stole the islands from China while China was weak in the nineteenth 
century and then held on to them with US aid.14 Hankyoreh (한겨레신
문), another left-wing newspaper, published an article titled 'Are the 
Diaoyu Islands becoming the second Manchuria', hinting thereby that 
Japanese occupation of the islands is as illegal as the Japanese takeover 
of Manchuria was in the 1930s, thereby faithfully repeating the views of 
newspapers in the People's Republic of China on the issue.15 Similarly, 
left-wing bloggers openly claimed that the islands belong to China and 
that the only reason that Japan can indulge in disputing ownership of 
Tokdo and the Diaoyu Islands with both Korea and China simultane-
ously is American 'imperialist' support. Thus, while fanning anti-Japanese 
sentiments they also sought to trigger anti-American sentiments, while 
putting a gloss of neutrality on their views by advocating that Korea do 
nothing in support of either party. This was clearly a message directed at 
refuting the views of conservatives who sought more active cooperation 
with Japan and the USA against China in the East China Sea.16
More right-wing newspapers, in contrast, have shown ambiguous 
attitudes towards the dispute. The right-wing daily Dong-A Ilbo loudly 
denounced Japan's militarist past as part of the denunciation of Japan's 
territorial claims on Tokdo and historical revisionism on the comfort 
women issue.17 However, with regard to the islands dispute, it was more 
concerned about the economic fallout from the Sino–Japanese conﬂict 
than about the issue of who deserves Korea's support.18 The conservative 
Chosunilbo also vocally denounced Japanese aggression on the Tokdo 
issue and warned that if Japan continues to veer to the far right it will 
14 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 32(1)•2014
Niv Horesh, Hyun Jin Kim, Peter Mauch and Jonathan Sullivan __________________
fall into ruin as it did during the Second World War. It added further 
that Japan's actions with regard to the Tokdo and Senkaku Islands 
disputes show that Japan is still dreaming the delusional militaristic 
vision of expansion that brought Japan low in the past.19 However, the 
newspaper also soon balanced this sharp rebuke of Japan with caution 
about supporting China on the issue. The newspaper reminds viewers 
that the Chinese claims in the East China Sea and the seas off the coasts 
of Okinawa already may infringe on the territorial rights and economic 
interests of Korea to the south.20
Joongangilbo, another conservative daily, went so far as to claim that 
Japan's lurch to the right is reaching dangerous levels and that Japan is 
on its way to developing a nuclear weapons program that is threaten-
ing to Korea.21 However, in blogs associated with the newspaper, China 
was also vehemently denounced for its arrogant attitude and territo-
rial ambitions in the East China Sea, the ultimate goal of which, it was 
claimed, is to create a new tributary system in its favour in East Asia.22 
Other conservative or centre-right newspapers tended to emphasize 
more the fact that this territorial dispute between China and Japan has 
the potential to infringe also on Korea's territorial claims and EEZs in 
the East China Sea and Sea of Japan.23
Because of the similarities between this dispute and the Tokdo dis-
pute between Korea and Japan, the Korean blogosphere has featured 
some interesting commentaries on the issue. Although it is difﬁcult to 
quantify, at the outbreak of the crisis in 2012, the dominant response to 
the dispute among Korean netizens who left comments on blogs and 
newspapers online, was support for China and hatred for Japan, which 
was disputing Tokdo with Korea. However, by the time bloggers started 
analysing the situation in detail, the mood had palpably shifted. Some 
blogs placed the dispute within the context of other territorial disputes 
across East Asia, mostly involving China and Japan, and adopted a 
dispassionate commentary approach.24 Some were even surprisingly 
hostile to China and accused the Chinese government of using the is-
sue to hide internal problems and justify its naval build-up, which is a 
threat to Korea.25
Still others advocated caution and warned against openly supporting 
China on the issue, despite dislike of Japan, because Korea's position 
vis-à-vis Japan on Tokdo is actually more similar to Japan's vis-à-vis 
China, than China's vis-à-vis Japan. If Japan were to lose the Senkakus 
on grounds proposed by China, Korea may be placed at a disadvantage, 
if disputes escalated over Tokdo with Japan, on those same grounds. 
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People were reminded that Korea has ongoing territorial disputes 
with China as well.26 Many were simply neutral on the issue, noting 
the huge economic and strategic beneﬁts of controlling these islands, 
which is driving both China and Japan to contest them, and advised that 
Koreans simply be observant about the arguments employed by both 
sides in advancing their claims.27 Some were, however, more emotive 
and expressed a common feeling of sorts with the Chinese because of 
Korea's problem with Japan on the Tokdo issue and advocated support 
for China on the issue.28
As time passed and disputes with China returned to the attention of 
Koreans, the initial warmth of Korean feeling towards China, which 
was perceived to be engaged in the same struggle as Korea against the 
aggressions of Japan, slowly cooled. The majority of newspaper editori-
als and blogs (including reader commentaries) swung in the direction 
of caution and the urge to pick sides in the dispute quickly vanished. 
The advice of most bloggers and academic experts was to keep a level 
head, be alert about what the dispute will mean for Korea and to think 
strategically for the national beneﬁt. Korea, as usual stuck in the mid-
dle between Japan and China, has its share of pro-Japanese (less vocal) 
and pro-Chinese (more vocal) advocates. However, the vast majority 
in the middle now seem to favour a much more nuanced and sensible 
approach to the dispute, which is in line with the caution displayed by 
the rest of the international community on the issue. 
Socotra Rock: A Sino–Korean Bone of Contention
The dispute between China and South Korea over Socotra Rock involves 
complex historical, nationalistic, territorial, administrative, economic 
and defence issues. Interestingly, Socotra Rock remains relatively un-
known to the outside world—including Japan. Indeed, one Japanese 
netizen has frankly admitted that Socotra Rock is 'unfamiliar to [Japa-
nese] ears'.29 This perhaps necessitates a brief introduction. Socotra 
Rock (lat. 125°10'56.81'E; long. 32°07'22.63'N) is located in the Yellow 
Sea, some 150 kilometres southwest from South Korea's Marado Island, 
and some 250 kilometres northeast from China's Haijiao Island (the 
nearest Japanese island is located only 275 kilometres away). Known 
in Korean as Ieodo (or Parangdo) and in Chinese as Suyan, it is not 
an island but a submerged coral reef, which, at low tide, is 4.6 metres 
beneath the ocean's surface. Centuries-old Korean legends caution that 
sailors and ﬁshermen who see the reef will never return home; the Brit-
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ish merchant vessel, Socotra, which spotted the reef in 1900 (and which 
presumably remained ignorant of Korean legends), not only returned 
to London but also bestowed upon the reef its English-language name, 
Socotra Rock. 
Japan's victory in the Russo–Japanese War in 1904–1905 ensured, over 
the ensuing decades, that the Imperial Japanese Navy maintained control 
of the waters surrounding Socotra Rock. This remained the case until 
Japan's defeat in World War II. Thereafter, Socotra Rock bubbled beneath 
the surface of Sino–South Korean relations. In 1952, even as the Korean 
War raged, the South Korean government promulgated the so-called 
Syngman Rhee line. This line speciﬁcally included Socotra Rock within 
Korean territorial waters. The People's Republic of China declined to 
recognize this line. South Korea in the 1990s ignored Chinese objections 
and began building a weather station on Socotra Rock. 
Not until completion of the weather station did Socotra Rock become 
a hot-button issue in Sino–South Korean relations. Technically speaking, 
the dispute is not a territorial issue. According to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, a submerged reef—such as Socotra 
Rock—cannot be considered national territory. Yet, in seemingly open 
deﬁance of the United Nations, the South Korean government insists 
that Socotra Rock is clearly South Korean territory. At the very least, 
South Korea maintains that it will not budge from the basic insistence 
that Socotra Rock falls within its own EEZ. The Chinese government, 
which also claims that Socotra Rock lies within its EEZ, has registered its 
'opposition' to 'unilateral [South Korean] actions' on Socotra Rock (Sawa 
2007). In March 2012, a Chinese ofﬁcial hinted at Chinese unilateralism 
concerning Socotra Rock. The ofﬁcial sparked a diplomatic row when he 
publicly noted that, because Socotra Rock is located in Chinese waters, 
it is most certainly Chinese. 
It is difﬁcult to characterize Japanese responses to this Sino–South Ko-
rea diplomatic row. Some have expressed surprise. 'Territorial disputes 
are not only a Sino–Japanese and Korean–Japanese issue', commented 
the online news source, News U.S.30 The vastly more reputable News-
week carried an article with a similar sentiment; it noted that China's 
seemingly 'endless' appetite encompassed 'not just Okinawa'.31 Such 
surprise is perhaps understandable. On the one hand, Socotra Rock (as 
already noted) remains largely unknown in Japan. On the other hand, 
the Japanese are preoccupied with their own nation's manifold territo-
rial disputes, including those involving not only China and South Korea 
but also Russia, North Korea and Taiwan. 
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Some Japanese see in the Socotra Rock dispute conﬁrmation of what 
they regard as Chinese expansionism. News U.S. put it simply: 'China's 
plan to conquer East Asia has at last begun to gain momentum'.32 One 
netizen voiced a similar notion: 'China is showing its limitless greed'.33 
One blogger reckoned that, because the colonial powers (including Ja-
pan) had sliced China up in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
China now 'wants to expand its defensive line as far as possible'. That 
defensive line, according to this blogger, extends far beyond the Asian 
mainland and most certainly includes Socotra Rock, principally because 
the Chinese want to ﬁght the United States in the Paciﬁc.34
Japanese bloggers do not spare South Korea in their analysis of the 
dispute over Socotra Rock. At least one blogger has pointed to the dis-
crepancy between the South Korean territorial claim over Socotra Rock 
and the UN's insistence that a sunken reef cannot be national territory.35 
Another pointed to the South Korean government's express desire for 
'sincere' discussions with China—and questioned then president Lee 
Myung-bak's own sincerity. As evidence, this blogger pointed to Lee's 
rejection of then Japanese prime minister Noda Yoshihiko's letter con-
cerning the Liancourt Rocks.36 It should also be acknowledged that Ja-
pan's fringe-dwelling extreme right wing takes delight in the Sino–South 
Korean dispute over Socotra Rock; the extreme right tends to be derisive 
in its treatment of South Korea. One example should sufﬁce: China is 
'conscious that it is lying' about its claim over Socotra Rock, while South 
Korea is a 'paranoid, compulsive liar'. The blog concludes by noting that, 
if China continues to insist that even Okinawa Prefecture is Chinese ter-
ritory, then Korea's fate is all but sealed. It predicts the arrival of the day 
when the Korean peninsula again becomes a Chinese 'tributary'.37
One armchair strategist believes that Japan and South Korea could 
'clash' militarily over Takeshima/Tokdo and that such a Japanese–South 
Korean clash would provide China with a 'good opportunity to attack 
and occupy Socotra Rock'. Our erstwhile armchair strategist noted that 
South Korea would then ﬁnd itself ﬁghting great powers on either side, 
and concluded that Poland's fate at the hands of Germany and the Soviet 
Union in 1939 could well revisit South Korea. Such thinking sparked 
comments from any number of other armchair strategists. 'Has China 
realized that is not in its best interests to go to war with Japan?' asked 
one. Another lamented the Japanese government's unwillingness to take 
a similarly 'hard-line stance' in its dealings with its neighbours.38 
There are also those who would welcome Japan's active involve-
ment in the dispute over Socotra Rock. The Rock evidently lies within 
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Japan's Air Defence Identiﬁcation Zone (ADIZ), which at the very least 
means that planes ﬂying thereover must ﬁrst gain Japan's approval. 
This includes the South Korean Air Force. One self-proclaimed expert 
in Japanese–Korean relations wrote in October 2012 that the South Ko-
rean Air Force had sought and received Japan's permission to ﬂy over 
Socotra Rock 17 times that year.39 Some bloggers emerged convinced 
that Socotra Rock is indeed 'Japanese territory'. Almost invariably, this 
sparked the imaginations of the Internet's wannabe diplomats. 'If you 
swap Takeshima', wrote one, 'Japan will recognize [South Korea's claim 
to Socotra Rock]'.40
The Changbai/Paekdu Dispute through Japanese Eyes
Japanese perceptions of the Sino–Korean dispute over Changbai/Paek-
du Mountain are equally fragmented and complex. Changbai/Paekdu 
Mountain's volcanic summit cups a crater lake on the Sino–North Korean 
border. Chinese regard Changbai (Chinese name) Mountain as very 
much part of Manchuria; Koreans see Paekdu (Korean name) Mountain 
as the birthplace of their culture and also remember it as the nerve centre 
of resistance to Japan's colonial rule over their peninsula during the early 
twentieth century. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il was, moreover, (re-
putedly) born on Changbai/Paekdu Mountain, and the North Korean 
government regards it as 'sacred territory' (Kin 2003).
Let us begin with a review of academic views of the dispute. Akizuki 
Nozomi (2010) has argued that the Changbai/Paekdu issue (like other 
territorial issues in the region) has arisen at least partly because of the 
difﬁculties inherent in applying modern international law to areas that 
until the 1800s operated under a very different world system. Akizuki 
has also reminded readers that Japan sought deﬁnitive answers to 
territorial questions in the early twentieth century. In this regard, he 
has drawn readers' attention to Shinoda Jisaku's groundbreaking 1938 
study of the Sino–Korean border, which asserted unequivocally that 
Changbai/Paekdu Mountain had long been Korean territory. Kyoto 
University's Nakanishi Terumasa (2013) has written of a 'new Cold 
War', which he believes will characterize Sino–Japanese relations. He 
argues that the Changbai/Paekdu issue bodes well for Japan, insofar as 
it should smooth the way for closer Japanese–Korean friendship, forged 
in opposition to China.
One suspects that Nakanishi has gained a little more traction with 
his essay than has Akizuki with his strictly academic text. One Japanese 
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blogger registered incredulity with South Korea's claim over Changbai/
Paekdu Mountain. He notes two points. First, North Korea maintains 
near silence over the issue. Second, Changbai/Paekdu Mountain is 
physically very far removed from South Korean territory. He argues that 
South Korea had 'unilaterally' created this problem, and contrasts the 
South Korean stance with that of North Korea's 'silence'. This silence he 
attributes to the fact that China is North Korea's only 'lifeline' and that 
North Korea feels utterly unable to 'complain' to China. He concludes 
that Japan should 'learn' from China, and come out strongly against 
South Korean attempts to change the name of the Sea of Japan.41 
Another Japanese netizen has registered his surprise at this territorial 
dispute. He acknowledged that he had long known of a widespread 
Chinese 'backlash' against the Koreans. In this regard, he pointed to 
a Chinese conception of the Koreans as having failed to develop their 
own culture and having simply 'stolen' Chinese culture. He regarded 
the Changbai/Paekdu issue as evidence that Sino–Korean disputes go 
beyond the cultural realm and include territorial problems.42
Many Japanese bloggers tend to view the Changbai/Paekdu issue 
through the prism of territorial issues that involve Japan. One has asked 
whether any 'demonstration movements' (similar to those that bedevil 
Sino–Japanese relations) have arisen in China over the Changbai/Paek-
du issue. Another concludes that the Chinese 'make their own maps' 
and therefore dispute territory with virtually all of their neighbours, 
including Japan. Yet another states simply that the Chinese are the 'same 
as a band of robbers'. Having read these (and other) comments, another 
blogger concluded that China is bent on expansion, then veered away 
from the Changbai/Paekdu issue to note that Chinese citizens living in 
Japan may well be 'preparing for an internal [Japanese] revolt', which 
would presumably assist China in its claims over the Senkaku Islands 
and even Okinawa Prefecture.43
Conclusion
Japan and South Korea are both wealthy industrial powerhouses that 
have much more in common with each other than with China, and are 
both strategically allied with the USA. Yet, although the political estab-
lishments in both countries might see China as a constant threat, Korea 
and Japan still popularly view each other with suspicion. By contrast, 
popular perceptions of the China threat in either country can be swayed 
by escalation of territorial disputes these two US allies still have with 
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one another. In that sense, it is hardly surprising that the famous rap-
port between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi worked to embolden Japanese 'nationalists and reactionaries', 
much to the chagrin of both the South Korean and Chinese leadership 
(Calder 2008).
In the realm of popular sentiment, Korea's ongoing historical and ter-
ritorial disputes with both China and Japan disallow clear-cut solidarity 
with either party or explicit analogies with the dispute between China 
and Japan, because both powers are regarded as being dangerous to 
South Korea and not trusted by any means. The escalation of the Ja-
pan–China dispute in 2012, which immediately followed South Korea's 
most recent spat with Japan over Tokdo, temporarily led to more positive 
public opinion towards China, but quickly gave way to more balanced 
analysis of the issue. If the dispute was to recur now in the midst of 
North Korea's threats against South Korea, support for Chinese claims 
would likely be ambiguous. This is in part due to China's continued 
reluctance to rein in its 'client' state, (given the perception that North 
Korea is merely a 'vassal' or worse a 'puppet' of China), which also pricks 
the nationalist pride of many South Koreans. The academic community 
and policy making elite in South Korea favour aligning Korea with the 
USA and Japan against Chinese naval expansion in the East and South 
China Seas. However, deep political divisions between the political left 
(which favours China and North Korea) and the right (which favours 
the USA and Japan) and the continuing question of Tokdo are likely to 
prevent South Korea from effectively coordinating a common response 
with Japan against China in the foreseeable future.
Similarly, in view of the Takshima/Tokdo dispute, Japanese bloggers 
hardly spare South Korea in their analysis of the dispute over Socotra 
Rock. Their respective alliance with the USA notwithstanding, many 
Japanese appear concerned about rapprochement between China and 
South Korea. However, others in Japan's far right might actually revel 
in escalation of the Socotra or Changbaishan disputes as a form of teach-
ing South Korea a 'lesson' in middle-power hubris. In the background 
lingers much phobia about putative Chinese designs on Okinawa or 
mainland Korea, putative Korean designs on China's northeast and 
bitter memories of Japan's wartime brutality. While identifying popular 
suspicion and resentment in Northeast Asia is a conﬁrmatory ﬁnding, 
one issue this article points to that deserves further attention is growing 
unease about South Korea's delicate balancing act in the face of China's 
rise. Economically (and culturally) close to China, and quite often at 
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loggerheads with Japan, South Korea's experience of the 1980s–1990s is 
highly germane to China's ongoing reforms. South Korea is also a US ally 
whose conduct as a middle power is important to monitor in the context 
of deteriorating Sino–Japan relations and American re-balancing. 
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NOTES
1  This article derives from an international collaborative project focusing on contending 
national identities across Asia that has been initiated and led by Niv Horesh since 
2010. The ﬁrst research output of this project appeared in Kim, Mauch and Horesh 
(2012).
2  For example, there are no articles in the ofﬁcial Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) that 
explicitly discuss the Tokdo and Diaoyu disputes in tandem. For an academic treat-
ment, see Li and Qiu (2010).
3  For an example of the stridency of popular nationalism online, see Chase's (2011) 
analysis of Chinese reactions to UNESCO's decision to make the Gorguryeo Tombs 
a world heritage site.
4  There is an immense amount of literature on this dispute in Korean and in other lan-
guages. This territorial dispute, which South Korea refuses to acknowledge ofﬁcially 
since Tokdo is de jure and de facto part of Korea, continues to poison Korea–Japan 
relations. 
5  This highly publicized and acrimonious dispute between China and Korea over an-
cient history is mirrored by an equally acrimonious disagreement over more recent 
history between Korea and Japan, which receives treatment in Kimijima (2000).
6  For excellent analyses of the dispute over ancient history between China and South 
Korea and the negative effects of nationalist indoctrination in both countries, see Yi 
(2001) and Yi (2005).
7  See http://bit.ly/1iqf3em (accessed 26 September 2013).
8  The more radical exponent of this view is Gang (2012); however, there is a general 
wariness among the policy planning elite of South Korea about China's naval expan-
sion in the East and South China Seas, which they feel can develop into a long-term 
22 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 32(1)•2014
Niv Horesh, Hyun Jin Kim, Peter Mauch and Jonathan Sullivan __________________
threat to Korea's economic and strategic interests. A strengthening of the alliance 
and cooperation with the USA and Japan as a means of countering Chinese naval 
expansion is the dominant thinking among policy planners in Seoul (Jeong 2012).
9  Anti-Japanese sentiment generated by yet another spat with Japan over Tokdo in 
2012 shortly before the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ﬂared up again 
between China and Japan, inﬂuenced the views of the South Korean mass media 
and also bloggers towards the dispute between China and Japan. 
10  For instance, http://bit.ly/1is2KyF; http://bit.ly/1bqZjDg; http://bit.ly/1b21umr 
(last viewed 26 September 2013). The reader commentaries/responses to this blog's 
neutral approach and call for moderation were positive, with all commentaries 
emphasizing the negative economic consequences for Korea should the situation 
escalate. 
11  Every South Korean newspaper entry/editorial on the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands 
dispute prior to 26 September 2013 has been accessed and analysed for the purposes 
of this article.
12  Similarly, every Korean blog that discussed the crisis prior to 26 September 2013 has 
been accessed and analysed. Unfortunately there is simply no way of quantifying 
the extent to which these blogs and newspaper entries reﬂect Korean public opinion, 
since no polls were taken to determine accurately how the general public views the 
crisis and the belligerents involved. If, however, the representation in mass media 
(in this case newspapers and blogs) is taken as a reﬂection of the way in which the 
situation is presented to the Korean general public, their overall impact on public 
opinion is quite apparent. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of these blogs, reader 
commentaries and newspapers is a useful exercise in assessing public opinion in 
the absence of concrete polling data. 
13  See http://bit.ly/1ipXkDS (accessed 26 September 2013).
14  See http://bit.ly/1eTWcoa (accessed 26 September 2013).
15  See http://bit.ly/1dqrAcS (accessed 26 September 2013).
16  See http://bit.ly/1ipXkDS (accessed 26 September 2013).
17 See http://bit.ly/1b22kiR (accessed 26 September 2013; http://bit.ly/1cUMghG, 
accessed 26 September 2013).
18  See http://bit.ly/1b22tTr (accessed 26 September 2013; http://bit.ly/1buDGVY, 
accessed 26 September 2013).
19 See http://bit.ly/N2sqYs (accessed 26 September 2013).
20   See http://bit.ly/1ipZeUX (accessed 26 September 2013).
21  See http://bit.ly/LyABKc (accessed 26 September 2013).
22  See http://bit.ly/1dqs8Qa (accessed 26 September 2013).
23  See http://bit.ly/1iq04RD (accessed 26 September 2013).
24  See http://bit.ly/1at3hA7; http://bit.ly/1kTiD1Z (both accessed 26 September 
2013).
25  See http://bit.ly/1is4Gan (accessed 26 September 2013).
26  See http://bit.ly/1c3LHxS (accessed 26 September 2013).
27  See http://bit.ly/Mt9fpD; http://bit.ly/1is4Xdy; http://bit.ly/1g1ZmbE; http://
bit.ly/1fuOu5A (all accessed 26 September 2013).
28 See http://bit.ly/1c3Mjn9; http://bit.ly/1c3MkHE; http://bit.ly/1b23Kdi; http://
bit.ly/Mt9z7N; http://bit.ly/1c3MvCR; http://bit.ly/1b240ZD (all accessed 26 
September 2013).
29  See http://bit.ly/1lAHZ8H (accessed 23 August 2013).
30  See http://bit.ly/1lAHZ8H (accessed 23 August 2013). 
31  Newsweek Japan, 'Okinawa dake ja nai, Chūgoku no Hatenaki Sendo Ego', [It's not 
just Okinawa, China's inﬁnite territorial ego], 21 January 2013, http://bit.ly/1brbKPs 
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(accessed 2 August 2013).
32  See http://bit.ly/1lAHZ8H (accessed 23 August 2013).
33  See http://bit.ly/1fQYpnM (accessed 2 September 2013). 
34  See http://bit.ly/1eU1ujz (accessed 28 August 2013). 
35  See http://bit.ly/1is8jND (accessed 24 July 2013). 
36  See http://bit.ly/1iq93SR (accessed 1 September 2013). 
37  See http://bit.ly/1g25uRc (accessed 1 August 2013). 
38  See http://bit.ly/1nao3oy (accessed 31 July 2013). 
39  See http://amba.to/1dqvp1R (accessed 15 July 2013). 
40  See http://bit.ly/1iqaoZN (accessed 29 August 2013). 
41  See http://bit.ly/1b29dkf (accessed 19 August 2013). 
42  See http://bit.ly/1jfMwLT (accessed 13 August 2013). 
43  See http://bit.ly/1eU5l07 (accessed 29 August 2013). 
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